This article discusses the problem that open source software can not support compatibility standards, which have patent royalties. As the use of open source continues to grow, the article asks whether it makes sense to include a compatibility exception in patent law or require royalty-free licenses in formal standardization organizations and procurement policies. The article proposes that the answer may not be in the patent policies -be they from the government or from industry standard bodies -but perhaps in the practices of individual companies. While some companies want to collect licenses for their "intellectual property" no matter what, one can also observe that some major information technology companies have recently dedicated patents on a royalty-free basis to the use of open source developers without any standardization or regulatory pressures. Encouraging such company practices might be the best option for a government if it considers patent royalties on compatibility standards a policy problem.
Introduction
It has been long known that open source developers oppose software patentability and demand exceptions in patent law. One of the problem areas has been software interoperability. Recently, open source software developers have started to criticize industry-wide compatibility standards policies, which allow "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" (RAND) patent licenses. In essence, the critique is centered on the possibility to collect patent royalties from otherwise accessible standards. Since many open source licenses do not allow the collection of even "reasonable" patent royalties, it may be impossible to implement a RAND standard in open source software. Thus, such policies may in fact discriminate against open source developers and calling RAND standards "open" does not sound proper.
One can now argue that discrimination has nothing to do with the idea of "open standards" since standards are about technological compatibility and not about intellectual property policy. There is some truth in that statement. There is no unanimous definition of open standards and arguably most of the information technology industry agrees that standards can have RAND licenses -whatever that means.
1 For the information technology industry at large, reasonable licensing fees do not create barriers. Only open source advocates, academics and some small companies are arguing for royalty-free standards. For them, even reasonable fees can be a problem.
Traditionally, the excessive and anti-competitive use of intellectual property rights has been balanced through competition law. The recent Microsoft decision has highlighted how hard it can be even for European Union to force a software company to disclose their We start this article by briefly introducing the problem of patent royalties with open source software. Then, we go further than competition policy: we ask whether it makes sense to include a compatibility exception in patent law or require royalty-free licenses in formal standardization organizations and procurement policies. We summarize the policy discussion around the proposed, and now forgotten, software patent directive and review recent controversies on patent royalties at industry standard bodies. Finally, we discuss how truly open "royalty free" standards can be defined through procurement policies. Our main argument is that the root of the problem is not in the patent policies per sebe they from the government or from industry standard bodies -but merely in the practices of individual companies. While some companies want to collect licenses for their "intellectual property" no matter what, we can also observe that some major information technology companies have recently dedicated patents on a royalty-free basis to the use of open source developers without any standardization or regulatory pressures.
3 Encouraging such company practices might be the best a government can do if it considers patents on compatibility standards a policy problem. 
Open Source Software and Patent Licenses

Intellectual Property Policy on Compatibility Standards
We wouldn't discuss patent royalties on compatibility standards if intellectual property wouldn't apply to such standards in the first place. At the moment, one can have patents that cover for example file formats. If one wants to develop a new software product that can play popular mp3 music files or can access Microsoft's popular file systems, a patent license may be needed.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a major political battle was fought whether software standards could be copyrighted.
10 In Europe, the result crystallized in the software copyright directive from 1991,which stated that copyright protects only practical expression of computer programs (source code) and it does not reach to ideas and principles including interfaces.
11 Thus, compatibility standards can't be generally copyrighted. Copyright can only apply to e.g. specification documents but it can't prohibit in any way independent implementations of the specifications themselves.
In the early 2000s, the discussion has shifted towards patents. In Europe, a proposed directive on the patenting of "computer implemented innovations" became one of the fiercest lobbying events ever. Again, the discussion was polarized with two opposite positions. From historical perspective, one can see the software patent directive proposal as the next test case of the EU's established position on interoperability. Curiously, against the principles of the software copyright directive from 1991, the original Commission's proposal did not include any relevant exclusion for use of the patents to block compatible products from markets. 13 However, European parliament, after heavy lobbing from software patent critics, included a new limitation for interoperability:
Article 6a
Member States shall ensure that, wherever the use of a patented technique is needed for a significant purpose such as ensuring conversion of the conventions used in two different computer systems or networks so as to allow communication and exchange of data content between them, such use is not considered to be a patent infringement.
The software patent proponents understood far too well that the formulation of 6a could effective against the most valuable uses of software patents i.e. patents on compatibility standards. Therefore they launched immediately a high profile counter attack including a letter from the CEOs of the biggest technology companies Europe, which warned 14 :
"…However, the vote in Parliament on 24 September 2003 has completely turned the Commission's original proposal around, removing effective patent protection for much -and in the case of telecommunications and consumer electronics, probably most -of our R&D investment. This would have devastating consequences for our companies. It would be open for all-comers to exploit the results of our expensive R&D programmes at no cost, and even without any R&D overheads of their own. This is contrary to what was stated at the Lisbon European Council, namely that "innovation and ideas must be adequately rewarded within the new knowledge-based economy, particularly through patent protection."
The intervention was successful as the Council of Ministers removed in the end the article 6a in their response to Parliament's proposal. As a result, the Parliament turned down the whole directive proposal in the second reading in July 2005. This was seen as the only acceptable compromise for both lobbying parties. Pro-patent groups feared that the Parliament could again vote for interoperability exceptions. Likewise, antipatent groups feared that any possible exceptions could be changed anyway behind closed doors before the directive would be finally signed.
Unfortunately, the rejection of the directive means that the legal situation remains unclear. It is well known that European Patent Office has granted thousands of software patents that may cover compatibility standards. Whether those patents are truly valid, remains to be discussed at future patent policy forums. The working group soon suspended its activities and Sender ID didn't go any further at IETF. Again, the core Internet infrastructure argument won. Microsoft later commented: 20 "The test of whether Sender ID or any other proposed solution is an open standard is not whether it has been ratified through an open consensus-based process, but rather whether the proposal can be widely adopted."
Recent Controversies in Industry Standards Bodies
OASIS. OASIS is a leading web services standards body, which also recently revised its patent policies. This time the core infrastructure argument didn't win. After all, web services are seen more as industry standards with different business model possibilities than ubiquitous Internet technology. Thus, royalty free was included only as an option so the new policy is basically RAND. OASIS chairman commented: 21 "OASIS isn't an open-source organization ... We are a standards organization. We could have made the decision to be royalty-free, but we decided not to do that. We historically have been centered on http://news.com.com/W3C+patent+plan+draws+protests/2100-1023_3-273752.html?tag=nl.
the RAND option. The new policy is a better option for our members so that they have choices." 
Pro Open Source Procurement Policies in the European Union
In the midst of the debate around the proposed software patent directive, European Union also started to promote software procurement rules, which require the use of truly open compatibility standards without patent royalties. "European Interoperability Framework" defines open standards with three factors:
23
• The standard is adopted and will be maintained by a not-for-profit organization, and its ongoing development occurs on the basis of an open decision-making procedure available to all interested parties (consensus or majority decision etc.).
• The standard has been published and the standard specification document is available either freely or at a nominal charge. It must be permissible to all to copy, distribute and use it for no fee or at a nominal fee.
• The intellectual property -i.e. patents possibly present -of (parts of) the standard is made irrevocably available on a royalty free basis.
As noted, the "royalty free"-criteria for patents is critical for open source products because licensing patents is often not possible due to restrictions found in the open source licenses as described above. EU's policy goes even further in its support for open source software arguing:
"…OSS products are, by their nature, publicly available specifications, and the availability of their source code promotes open, democratic debate around the specifications, making them both more robust and interoperable. As such, OSS corresponds to the objectives of this Framework and should be assessed and considered favourably alongside proprietary alternatives."
Thus, it seems that governments -as major software users -have good reasons to avoid situations where open source can be discriminated against. Not surprisingly, the supporters of proprietary software have not watched this development passive. For example Business Software Alliance (BSA) attacked promptly the proposal and suggested that the patent licensing policy should be changed to RAND. 24 They further pointed out regarding the suggested procurement rules:
"BSA would also respectfully recommend that the EIF replace its current statements regarding OSS (specifically, the last bullet on page 8) with a statement encouraging the adoption and implementation of software procurement policies that are neutral with respect to technologies, development platforms and licensing models. Procurement policies that are based on reasonable, objective criteria, such as interoperability, security, and value for money, are not only consistent with the goal of interoperability, but also maximize competition, innovation, and consumer choice."
Conclusions
Open Industry standardization bodies are a different issue. Sometimes royalty-free requirements make sense, for example if the standard covers essential Internet infrastructure or is licensed by a dominant company. However, requiring patents on standards to be always royalty free is not necessarily the optimal solution as was seen from our examples. Allowing heterogeneity on the markets may be more important than categorical discrimination against some established business practice such as patent royalties on standards. Thus, we recommend any technology standardization body should carefully investigate both the benefits and drawbacks of requiring royalty-free patent licenses. Royalty-free terms do explicitly prohibit discrimination against open source software but at the same time they can decrease the possible business models available to those companies, which actually develop new technology on the standards.
In fact, open source may not suffer from patents at all if the patent holders have enough incentives to support open source. As noted before, some of the biggest technology companies have announced that they license some of their patents royalty free to open source developers without any formal standardization or regulatory pressures. This suggests that companies can sometimes, when it fits their strategy, to gain more from the maximum adoption of standards than by limiting the adoption 24 with patent royalties. 25 Encouraging such company practices might be the best a government can do if it considers patents on compatibility standards a policy problem.
To conclude, the answer to our question "Do patent law exceptions and royalty-free requirements make sense" is that the devil is in the details. For governments and the society at large, such policies seem to make often sense. But for the industry, such policies may not be needed. The dynamics of the standardization game seem to imply that proprietary standard strategies are never dominant in the entire industry and will be eventually cracked by competitive forces. 
